- The door to arms exports has opened, but why are companies seeking alternative routes?
- First, the allocation for the Ukrainian military must be fulfilled before overseas sales can begin.
- It is not just a single document; it is a gateway that can take up to 90 days.
- Therefore, companies often say, u0022Buy our production capacity, not just our products.u0022
- The export proceeds are flowing back into the defense industry, but the results are still unclear.
- In this system, the true test is not whether loopholes exist, but rather its actual effectiveness.
- Frequently Asked Questions.
The door to arms exports has opened, but why are companies seeking alternative routes?
A Ukrainian defense technology pavilion has been established at the Army exhibition in Washington. However, the reality outside the exhibition hall is somewhat complex. While Ukraine has the capacity to produce weapons, it still faces difficulties in directly selling them to overseas buyers.
The Ukrainian government announced a new mechanism on July 1, 2026, during the martial law, allowing for the controlled export of domestically produced weapons and defense technology. However, this is not a complete opening of the market, but rather a conditional opening that prioritizes the needs of the military and the available production capacity.
In my opinion, the key issue in this situation is not the export permit itself. Ukraine is trying to revitalize its defense industry by entering overseas markets, but it faces a dilemma: it must first fill its own military ammunition stockpiles and production lines.
Exports are permitted, but the Ukrainian military must come first.
First, the allocation for the Ukrainian military must be fulfilled before overseas sales can begin.
According to the new regulations, companies must prioritize fulfilling the demand of the Ukrainian military. They must also demonstrate their ability to simultaneously fulfill national defense contracts and export contracts. This means that companies are not allowed to operate in a way that exaggerates their production capacity to secure overseas contracts first.
The Department of Defense may reject export permits if there are plans to procure the same items for the defense of Ukraine, or if the products are included in the list of core defense items. The practice of first sending drones and electronic warfare equipment needed in times of war to overseas locations and then distributing them to domestic forces is effectively prohibited by the system.
This principle directly affects the safety of not only the Ukrainian military but also those who are waiting for those weapons. While exports can help expand production lines, if urgently needed equipment is exported, the cost will be borne by soldiers and civilians on the battlefield. This creates a situation where long-term investment and short-term defense are in conflict at the same factory gate.
Therefore, even if the government frames exports as an industrial policy, the primary concern behind the final decision is the risk of a shortage of military supplies. Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that the strategic goal of all export contracts is to strengthen the defense industry foundation and supply more weapons to the military, and this is the reason behind it.
It is not just a single document; it is a gateway that can take up to 90 days.
The company faces more than just production capacity challenges. According to the official guidelines from the Ukrainian Department of Defense, the simplified procedure may take up to 30 days for review, while the standard procedure may take up to 90 days for a decision. In the field, the lifespan of technology is short, and the validity period of contracts is not long, but administrative processes proceed at a different pace.
To use the standard procedure, companies must register with the National Export Control Agency. They must also submit a contract or draft contract with a foreign buyer, a letter of intent or official request, and guarantee documents from the importing country. This process confirms who the buyer is, what the items will be used for, and whether they will be transferred onward to another country.
In the export of military supplies, such verification cannot be simply viewed as bureaucratic red tape. While drones and electronic warfare technology from Ukraine can enhance the defense capabilities of allied nations, the leakage of technology and re-export pose new security risks. Both the complaints about the slow approval process and the arguments for the necessity of control measures are grounded in reality.
The problem lies in the fact that the speed at which a system is described on paper may differ from the speed at which it is experienced in practice. Phantom Defense stated that there is a significant gap between the official procedures and their actual implementation, and pointed out that the new export licensing process could become a bottleneck for companies. This is an assessment from an industry source, and is not a confirmed failure based on government-wide statistics. However, if companies repeatedly raise the same concerns, there is sufficient reason to interpret this as a flaw in the administrative process.
If the permit is the bottleneck, the production line will also stop.
Therefore, companies often say, u0022Buy our production capacity, not just our products.u0022
Under these conditions, the paths that Ukrainian defense companies are exploring are not limited to traditional exports. They are considering options such as classifying products as dual-use, pursuing joint production with foreign companies, or having foreign governments directly procure production from Ukrainian companies.
Dual-use products can be used for both civilian and military purposes, and therefore may be subject to different classifications and review processes than standard military supplies. The CEO of Oko Camera stated that the company is registered as a dual-use enterprise, which made it easier to export to customers in Europe and non-European countries compared to pure defense companies. However, this classification does not automatically guarantee a faster process for all products and all customers.
Overseas co-production is a method of connecting technology and capital with foreign entities. A more interesting approach is when a foreign government directly supports the production of a Ukrainian company. Instead of sending finished products outside of Ukraine, foreign funds are used to manufacture weapons in a Ukrainian factory, and the resulting products are used to support the Ukrainian military.
The Danish model is a representative example. This structure involves foreign governments providing financial support for the production of weapons by Ukrainian defense companies, and then supplying the finished products to the Ukrainian armed forces. Rather than trying to pass through the narrow door of export permits, it is essentially ordering the production of goods needed by the Ukrainian armed forces using foreign funds. This is more akin to an investment in the supply chain than a simple arms sale.
According to data compiled by the KSE Institute, at least 180 defense industry collaborations have been initiated between Ukrainian companies and foreign companies since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine. However, approximately 22% of these collaborations have not yet progressed to the stage of actual implementation. The increase in the number of collaborations is one thing, while the actual operation of factories is another. A memorandum of understanding does not, after all, put production facilities into operation.
The export proceeds are flowing back into the defense industry, but the results are still unclear.
The government has also proposed a plan to reinvest the money earned from exports back into industry. It announced that 20% of the proceeds from exports of finished products and defense technology, and 30% of the proceeds from exports of components, will be allocated to a special national budget fund for the development of the defense industry. The minimum contract amount for contracts involving the export of finished products is set at UAH 15 million.
If this structure functions properly, overseas sales are not simply revenue. They can serve as a source of funding to expand production facilities, research and development, and supply chains, while also maintaining jobs. In the long term, export revenue has the potential to create a virtuous cycle, enabling the supply of more weapons to the Ukrainian military.
However, there is a clear condition attached to this. It has not yet been confirmed to what extent the increase in exports has actually increased production, employment, and revenue. There is a long period between the announcement of a contract for exports and the completion of delivery. If administrative delays and a lack of funds occur during this period, the actual number of equipment delivered, despite impressive figures, may be limited.
President Zelensky stated that the Drone Deal will include at least 10 contracts for the export of Ukrainian weapons. He also announced that agreements have been reached with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar for a 10-year period, and that requests have been received from 11 countries. However, it is important to note that requests, contracts, production, and actual delivery are distinct stages. Blurring these distinctions turns industrial policy into mere propaganda, and the audience becomes a victim of numbers.
In this system, the true test is not whether loopholes exist, but rather its actual effectiveness.
The Ukrainian government has clearly allowed exports under certain conditions. As the war continues, it is necessary to develop its own defense industry capabilities, which requires foreign capital and buyers. However, the moment weapons are exported while the domestic military’s needs are not being met, exports become a security burden rather than an industrial policy.
The government announced that it will operate a “Drone Deal” system for partner countries. For companies, this creates a pathway to access overseas markets, but they must pass registration with the National Export Control Agency, provide buyer documentation, and demonstrate production capacity. The system is now in place, but the “key” to accessing it is still held by various agencies.
The KSE Institute identified several obstacles to defense industry cooperation, including unclear regulations, complex export procedures, limited administrative capacity, and the absence of a single point of contact. If these criticisms are accurate, the problem lies not simply in whether approvals are strict, but in whether that strictness is predictable and consistently applied. Companies are more significantly affected by the uncertainty of waiting without knowing the reasons for delays than by outright rejections.
I believe there are three things we need to consider going forward. First, we need to see documentation that confirms the demand from the Ukrainian military was actually prioritized. Second, we need to verify whether the official procedures, which specify a maximum of 30 days and a maximum of 90 days, are actually followed in the contract and shipping processes. Third, we need to determine whether the “Denmark model” and the joint production initiative extend beyond the announcement and translate into actual factory operation and delivery.
The reason why Ukrainian defense companies find it difficult to sell weapons abroad is not due to a lack of technology. It is because they must first fulfill domestic wartime demand, pass national export controls and end-user verification. They must also demonstrate any remaining production capacity. These requirements, while burdensome, are necessary safeguards for arms trading during wartime.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s options are not simply whether to open or close exports. The key is whether it can develop the operational capability to attract overseas funding and technological cooperation into its production lines without compromising its domestic defense. A declaration of opening the door is less important than the weapons that pass through it, where they are made, and to whom they are delivered; that will be a more accurate measure of success.
Frequently Asked Questions.
Has Ukraine completely lifted its restrictions on arms exports?
No. While a controlled export mechanism was announced on July 1, 2026, it is a conditional system that first assesses the demand of the Ukrainian military, the fulfillment of national defense contracts, and production capacity.
What is the biggest reason why Ukrainian defense companies find it difficult to sell weapons abroad?
This is because domestic military demand must be met first, and it requires submitting documents such as registration with the National Export Control Agency, contracts with foreign buyers, and import guarantees. The approval process under the standard procedure can take up to 90 days.
If a product is classified as having dual-use capabilities, does that automatically make it easier to export?
It is not automatically approved. However, the CEO of Oko Camera explained that dual-use enterprise registration is more advantageous for securing overseas customers than for purely defense-related companies. The actual application may vary depending on the specific item and customer.
How does the Danish model differ from typical arms export practices?
This involves foreign governments directly providing financial support to Ukrainian companies and using the produced weapons to support the Ukrainian military. The focus is on maintaining a production base within Ukraine, rather than selling finished products overseas.
Is the defense industry cooperation with Ukraine leading to actual production?
According to data from the KSE Institute, while a minimum of 180 international defense industry collaborations were initiated since the full-scale war began, approximately 22% have not yet progressed to the actual implementation stage. It is important to distinguish between the number of collaborations and the actual deliveries.