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Monday, November 23, 2026
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Will the factories continue to operate, producing the 30,000 drones for the U.S. Department of Defense?

미군용 소형 드론이 생산 시설에서 조립되거나 시험 비행 중인 모습

“We purchased 30,000 drones, but will the factory continue to operate?”

The U.S. Army included 30,000 small drones in a single procurement competition. However, the number that manufacturers actually want is different: 1,000 units per month for a year.

This is where the United States’ curious underlying motives in drone policy come to light. The Department of Defense says it will buy in large quantities, while industry asks it first to demonstrate a commitment to keep buying over the long term. I believe this gap is the key to determining whether the United States’ bulk-procurement policy is creating a stable production base.

The initial orders are large. The subsequent orders are uncertain.

Why is the United States accelerating drone production now?

Small drones have evolved from inexpensive reconnaissance equipment to a crucial component of military capability, encompassing offensive operations, electronic warfare, and anti-drone operations. With the increasing importance of drones in recent conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, the U.S. military is seeking to acquire drone capabilities with a faster procurement cycle than traditional weapon systems.

During the Biden administration, the Replicator initiative was proposed to secure affordable and expendable unmanned systems in preparation for a potential conflict with China. In June 2025, President Trump ordered the expansion of the U.S. industry for military and commercial drones, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth formalized this in July of the same year as a military production and procurement plan.

This policy is not simply about buying weapons. It is also an industrial policy aimed at establishing production lines and supply chains within the United States. The Congressional Research Service explained that the United States’ supply chain for small unmanned aerial vehicles has a vulnerability due to its reliance on adversarial nations. The Senate Appropriations Committee also expressed concerns about the vulnerability of the domestic production base.

Therefore, the demand created by the U.S. Department of Defense is not only for the purchase of military supplies but also serves as a signal to manufacturers. The problem is that, no matter how strong the signal is, factories cannot cover their electricity costs and labor costs based on that signal alone.

After securing a contract for 30,000 units, the real testing begins.

The U.S. Army, in a plan released in December 2025, announced that it would provide $1 billion to fund a competition involving four phases over two years for the production of small, single-use attack drones. The plan also stated a goal of supplying tens of thousands of units to the military in 2026 and hundreds of thousands of units in 2027.

The first Gauntlet program was originally scheduled to take place from February to July 2026, and the initial plan included 12 companies producing 30,000 drones. Subsequently, Breaking Defense reported that 11 companies were selected for the actual Gauntlet 1 program. The exact reasons for the change in the number of participating companies have not yet been confirmed.

According to the reported orders, 1,520 units were allocated to Farage Precision and 4,960 units to Neros. Judging by the numbers alone, these are clearly substantial quantities. However, companies deciding whether to expand their facilities, hire personnel, and reorganize their parts supply chains must be able to calculate what comes after these orders are completed.

The factory operates based on orders for tomorrow, rather than today’s contracts.

According to Breaking Defense, Gauntlet 2 awarded contracts of approximately 30,000 units each in the categories of deep strike and close combat, with 5 companies participating in each category. The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command announced that 19 drone companies and 5 payload companies participated in the evaluation, which took place at Fort Carson from August 16 to September 5, 2026.

However, it is not clear whether the quantities of 30,000 units for each of the Gauntlet 2 categories represent firm and finalized procurement contracts, or if some of them are optional or planned quantities. While the numbers are impressive, the nature of the contracts themselves may not necessarily be as substantial.

Competition fosters innovation, but it can create instability in supply chains.

The U.S. Army’s practice of repeatedly involving multiple companies in competition is understandable. Selecting a single company for an extended period can lead to technological stagnation or reduced price competitiveness. When multiple companies compete, there is a greater potential to rapidly test new technologies and to encourage lower prices and improved performance.

The U.S. Department of Defense has requested flexibility in allocating the budget, focusing on capability areas rather than specific weapon names. This is also within the same context. Because drone and anti-drone systems undergo rapid technological changes, a procurement system that relies on a single model for an extended period may not be realistic.

However, competition does not necessarily mean an expansion of production capacity. Jon Strzelec, who is in charge of advanced manufacturing of small drones at the U.S. Army Materiel Command, stated that the military recognizes that companies are reluctant to make production investments if there is a lack of certainty regarding future orders. U.S. Army official Andrew Evans also explained that a challenge is how to incentivize industry to build production facilities when orders are placed intermittently.

Industry complaints are more direct. Chad Chasteen of AV stated that the U.S. Army’s practice of constantly initiating new competitions and not maintaining a single solution for more than 1 to 2 years creates disruption in the supply chain. He said that continuous competition alone is not enough, and that consistent awards and consistent orders are also necessary.

At this point, I see the possibility that the policy design will end up being incomplete. The process of selecting companies is sophisticated, but the schedule for the selected company to maintain its production line remains blank.

Who will benefit, and who will receive the bill?

The U.S. Army can quickly acquire a large number of drones. It can also prevent companies with low initial performance or insufficient production capacity from being protected for an extended period. Repeated competition provides the military with options and gives companies the opportunity to participate in testing.

Skydio’s Callan Carpenter stated that there is demand not only from the Department of Defense but also from the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies, indicating a strong demand signal from the entire government. If considering all government agencies as a market, companies have the potential to expand their business beyond military procurement.

However, not all companies have the same capacity. James Slider of Performance Drone Works stated that supplying 1,000 drones per month for a year after receiving an award would be considered very healthy demand. On the other hand, a single test and a one-time order are insufficient to justify investments in equipment and expansion of the workforce.

John Burer of the American Center for Manufacturing & Innovation also pointed out that manufacturers will not proactively invest large sums of money unless there are large-scale contracts or consistent demand signals. While it is possible to quickly begin producing a single drone, a factory capable of mass production of thousands of units does not simply appear with the press of a button.

The costs are not borne solely by corporations. The U.S. Army’s FY2026 budget request for small unmanned aerial vehicles includes $747.9 million for procurement and $56.0 million for research, development, testing, and evaluation. The FY2025 reconciliation act also includes $1.4 billion to expand the small unmanned aerial vehicle industrial base.

From the perspective of taxpayers, it is not only the size of the announced amount that matters. What is more important is whether that money translates into actual deliveries and production capabilities, or whether it remains stuck in repeated testing and competition. While drone policies can be an investment for battlefield safety, if subsequent orders cease, only the costs of the industrial policy will remain.

We need to distinguish between the confirmed results and the numbers that are currently unavailable.

The confirmed facts are clear. The U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Army are considering the purchase of tens of thousands of drones, and are pursuing a program of approximately $1 billion over two years. At the congressional level, $1.4 billion has been allocated to expand the industrial base, and the U.S. Army has separately requested procurement and research and development funds.

However, it is not yet possible to definitively state that a stable production base has been established. It is unclear how many units were ultimately delivered through the “Drone Dominance” program, and the completion rates for each company have not been confirmed. It is also not yet known to what extent domestic production in the United States has reduced reliance on overseas supply chains, such as those in China.

The nearly $55 billion presented in the FY27 budget as a plan related to autonomous warfare and drones likewise cannot be considered fully approved and allocated funds. There is a process of congressional approval and oversight between the budget request and actual execution. In the defense budget, a “request” is only the starting point, not the finish line.

It has not been confirmed whether the goal of deploying small, single-use attack drones to all U.S. Army squads by the end of FY2026 has been achieved. This is because the initial contract numbers alone cannot demonstrate both fielding and industrial base capabilities.

A large contract and sustained production are two different scorecards.

The next order will be the true answer to the policy.

The most important factors to consider are the existence and nature of follow-up orders. It is necessary to confirm whether there are regular enough orders for companies to invest in equipment and personnel, and whether the companies selected in the competition are actually continuing to fulfill repeat orders.

If the U.S. Army establishes order cycles that maintain competition while allowing manufacturers to remain viable, both goals can be achieved. This approach fosters technological innovation and price competition while also strengthening the domestic manufacturing base. On the other hand, if new competitions are constantly initiated and orders are sporadic, competition is likely to become a hindrance to the supply chain rather than a driver of innovation.

If the demand from the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies actually materializes, it could partially fill the gap in military procurement. However, it is not appropriate to assume that the overall government demand will replace the long-term orders from the Department of Defense. This is because the missions, budgets, and procurement methods are different.

In my opinion, the U.S. Department of Defense’s policy of mass drone procurement has laid the first foundation for establishing a production base. However, fastening one button does not complete a bulletproof vest. To say that the United States has truly become a drone manufacturing powerhouse, evidence is needed that factories continue to operate, and that components and personnel are maintained, even after the 30,000-unit contract.

Ultimately, the success or failure of this policy will be determined not by the announcement itself, but by the next purchase order.

Frequently Asked Questions.

How many drones does the U.S. Department of Defense actually purchase?

In Gauntlet 1, 30,000 units were proposed as the supply target, and it was reported that 11 companies were selected. In Gauntlet 2, contracts of 30,000 units each were awarded for the two categories, but it is not clear whether all of these were finalized procurement contracts.

Is the foundation of the U.S. drone industry already stable?

It is too early to make a definitive conclusion. While large initial contracts and funding for expanding the industrial base have been secured, subsequent orders, the actual completion rate of deliveries, and whether long-term production can be sustained have not yet been confirmed.

Why does the U.S. Army not select a single company for a long-term contract?

The objective is to test new technologies and improve price and performance through repeated competition. However, frequent competition and irregular orders can create a burden on investments in production facilities and supply chains.

Is the nearly $55 billion in funding for U.S. drones an approved amount?

That is not correct. This refers to the amount presented in the FY27 budget, and it cannot be said that the entire amount has been approved and allocated by the legislature. The budget request and the actual execution must be distinguished.

Does the mass purchase of drones increase employment in the United States?

If the production expansion is successful, there is a possibility of an increase in manufacturing jobs and supply chain investments. However, based on the current data, it is not possible to confirm the actual scale of job creation.

DEFENSE DIGEST Editorial Team
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