China’s Enhancement of Long-Range Nuclear Missiles: What Has Changed?
China’s expansion of its nuclear capabilities goes beyond a simple increase in the number of warheads and is leading to the strengthening of a nuclear triad system that combines intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. Along with the expansion of mobile launch platforms, large-scale missile silos, and early warning systems (early warning), China’s nuclear deterrence posture is rapidly becoming more complex.
According to the annual report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in June 2026, China’s estimated number of nuclear warheads as of January 2026 is approximately 620. SIPRI assessed that China is currently the country increasing its nuclear arsenal at the fastest rate in the world.
Simultaneous expansion of nuclear warheads and ICBM silos
The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 report on Chinese military power assessed that China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads remained at a level of slightly over 600 in 2024, and that it could exceed 1,000 by 2030. While the figures from SIPRI and the U.S. Department of Defense differ due to variations in the time of investigation and classification criteria, they both agree that China’s nuclear forces are in a long-term expansion phase.
SIPRI announced that as of January 2026, hundreds of missiles were deployed at three large silo complexes in northern China, and approximately 30 silos were under construction in mountainous areas in eastern China. This indicates that China is transitioning from a structure that relied on a small number of mobile missiles to one that operates both fixed and mobile forces.
The U.S. Department of Defense assessed in its 2024 report that China’s ICBM forces, including launch platforms, comprise approximately 400 missiles. The 2025 report further analyzed that more than 100 of the ICBMs in three silo complexes are loaded with solid-fuel ICBMs of the DF-31 series.
Expansion of land-based nuclear forces from DF-41 to DF-61
DF-41: Mobility and Multiple Warhead Capability
DF-41 is China’s representative solid-fuel, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). SIPRI gives the DF-41’s estimated range as approximately 12,000 km, and the U.S. Department of Defense assesses that it can carry up to three independently targetable reentry vehicles per missile.
The ability to carry multiple warheads means that a single missile can attack multiple targets or place a greater interception burden on a defense network. However, the actual ability of a missile to penetrate a missile defense system depends not only on the number of warheads but also on factors such as decoys, flight path, early warning systems, and the performance of the interception system.
Public Disclosure of DF-61 and New DF-31
The Chinese Ministry of National Defense unveiled the DF-61 and a new type of DF-31 ground-based ICBM at a military parade held in September 2025. At the same event, the JL-3 SLBM and the Jingray-1 air-launched long-range missile were also displayed, marking the first time that China’s ground, sea, and air nuclear triad forces were presented together.
The detailed specifications of the DF-61, including its range and warhead configuration, have not been officially disclosed. However, the emergence of this new ICBM indicates that China continues to expand the survivability, response speed, and operational options of its land-based strategic missiles, even after the DF-41.
Significance of the 2024 Pacific ICBM Test
In September 2024, China launched an unarmed DF-31B intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from northern Hainan Island, flew it approximately 11,000 km, and had it splash down in waters near French Polynesia. The U.S. Department of Defense assessed this as the first full-range ICBM test China had conducted toward the Pacific since 1980.
This test served to verify the maximum range performance of the missile, and also to train the procedures for operating long-range strategic missiles in crisis situations. China informed the United States and France, among other countries, of its launch plans in advance.
JL-3 and Type 094 Strategic Submarine: Maritime Deterrence Capabilities
The JL-3 is China’s latest long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). SIPRI estimates its range to be over 10,000 km. China officially introduced the JL-3 as a submarine-launched intercontinental missile at a military parade in 2025.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2024 assessment, the Chinese Navy operates 6 Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and each submarine can carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 missiles. The extended range of the JL-3 allows Chinese submarines to place parts of the U.S. mainland within range, even when operating in waters closer to the Chinese mainland.
Strategic nuclear submarines can maintain their retaliatory strike capability while concealing their location, thereby increasing the survivability of nuclear forces. On the other hand, for Chinese submarines to operate from the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, they must pass through narrow straits and underwater surveillance networks. Therefore, the noise level of the submarines and the escort and anti-submarine warfare capabilities are critical factors in determining their actual deterrent effect.
Transition from Minimum Deterrence to High Readiness
The Chinese government has reaffirmed its commitment to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and its position of maintaining a minimum level of nuclear forces necessary for national security. A disarmament and non-proliferation policy document released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2025 also defined the purpose of nuclear force modernization as self-defense and maintaining strategic stability.
However, external evaluation agencies view the large-scale silo construction, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) ICBMs, and the expansion of naval nuclear forces as providing a wider range of nuclear operational options than the traditional minimum deterrence concept. In particular, the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that China is developing the capability of “preemptive counterstrike,” which involves launching counter-missiles before being hit after detecting enemy missiles.
This approach can enhance the survivability and responsiveness of nuclear forces, but in crisis situations, it also increases the risk that alarm errors or misinterpretations of the adversary’s intentions could lead to nuclear escalation. This is why the expansion of missile silos, early warning satellites, and ground-based radar systems must be viewed as a unified and integrated effort.
Impact on U.S. and Indo-Pacific Security
The expansion of China’s long-range nuclear missiles is prompting the United States to develop a nuclear deterrence strategy that considers both Russia and China. The United States is simultaneously pursuing nuclear “three-axis” modernization, homeland early warning systems, missile defense in the Indo-Pacific region including Guam, and extended deterrence consultations with its allies.
In both Japan and South Korea, China’s ICBMs, as well as medium-range missiles and strategic bombers capable of dual use (nuclear and conventional), are major security concerns. The strengthening of anti-submarine warfare capabilities in Australia and Japan is also becoming increasingly important, coinciding with the expansion of the operational range of China’s strategic nuclear submarines.
The environment for arms control is, rather, deteriorating. SIPRI pointed out that negotiations for a new arms control agreement, which would include China, are not materializing, even as the New START treaty between the United States and Russia is set to expire in February 2026. Transparency in nuclear forces, advance notification of missile tests, and the establishment of crisis management channels are emerging as key tasks for long-term strategic stability.
Future outlook and key observation points
China’s increase in long-range nuclear missiles requires attention not only to the number of warheads but also to the changes in its power structure. On land, silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs coexist. At sea, the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile and strategic nuclear submarines are enhancing retaliatory capabilities. The early warning system is improving the readiness posture of its nuclear forces.
- Warhead production rate: Whether it will increase to 1,000 or more by 2030.
- Silo operation method: Actual loading quantity and missile dispersion deployment method.
- New ICBM: DF-61, including its range, warhead configuration, and deployment scale.
- Naval Nuclear Power: Expansion of JL-3 operations and development of next-generation strategic nuclear submarines.
- Alert and Command System: Early warning and retaliatory posture, and peacetime nuclear warhead loading levels.
The key issue going forward is how China’s officially stated “no first use” nuclear policy aligns with the actual scale and readiness of its nuclear forces. If the US-China strategic dialogue is not restored, the risk not only of an expansion of nuclear forces but also of misinterpreting the other side’s intentions will increase.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
How many nuclear warheads does China possess?
SIPRI estimates that, as of January 2026, China possesses approximately 620 nuclear warheads. The exact number is not disclosed by China, so estimates vary between institutions depending on the timing and criteria used.
What is the range of the DF-41?
Based on publicly available data, SIPRI estimates the range to be approximately 12,000 km. It is assessed to be capable of placing the continental United States within its range and of carrying up to three independently targetable warheads.
Is the DF-61 a replacement for the DF-41 missile?
China unveiled the DF-61 at a military parade in 2025, but did not disclose its specific performance characteristics or deployment structure. It is currently difficult to definitively determine whether the DF-61 is a complete replacement for the DF-41, or a follow-on system designed for separate missions.
Can the JL-3 strike the continental United States?
The estimated range of the JL-3 is over 10,000 kilometers. Depending on the launch location and target location, it is assessed that some parts of the continental United States may be within its range from the Chinese mainland or adjacent waters.
Does China maintain a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons?
The Chinese government officially maintains the principle of not being the first to use nuclear weapons. However, with the expansion of missile silos and early warning systems, international attention is increasing regarding the actual operational posture in crisis situations.
What is the impact of China’s nuclear missile buildup on South Korea?
This could affect the US-China strategic competition, regional missile defense, and the ROK-US extended deterrence consultations. The expansion of China’s intermediate-range nuclear and conventional dual-use missiles, as well as its early warning systems, is a factor that increases the risk of military miscalculation and escalation in the Korean Peninsula region.
