- A company specializing in light shows is manufacturing 4,000 attack drones.
- The plan for hundreds of thousands of units originated in the contract.
- Why is it a new company rather than an existing defense company?
- The real bottleneck is not the aircraft itself, but the components.
- The burden is shared between combat units and taxpayers.
- The United States’ testing ground is mass production.
- Frequently Asked Questions.
A company specializing in light shows is manufacturing 4,000 attack drones.
The company that the United States ordered a minimum of 4,000 single-use attack drones from, for a cost of at least US$25 million, is not a traditional defense industry company. It started as a drone light show company.
Swarm Defense Technologies originated from Firefly Drone Shows, a company specializing in commercial drone light shows. According to the company, Firefly has manufactured over 20,000 drones for swarm operations since 2017. This manufacturing experience is now being tested in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles for battlefield use.
The stage has changed.
The key question is this: Can the United States actually mass-produce inexpensive attack drones?
Currently, the answer is not clear. The Drone Dominance Program plans to procure hundreds of thousands of units in stages, but whether the newly established companies can meet the promised production volume and establish a stable, non-Chinese supply chain is still under verification.
The plan for hundreds of thousands of units originated in the contract.
The U.S. Department of Defense‘s Drone Dominance Program is an initiative to mass-produce low-cost, expendable small unmanned aircraft using a supply chain based in the United States. The official solicitation called for pursuing fixed-price orders totaling $1 billion over four phases.
The structure is simple: the company bears the risks of development and production. The government only pays for aircraft that have been delivered, inspected, and accepted.
First, create it, and then receive it.
This method offers taxpayers the advantage of cost control. This is because the government does not provide upfront payments for unproduced prototypes. However, this poses a significant burden for newly established companies. The costs of expanding production facilities and securing components are incurred upfront, and if the company fails to secure a contract, it bears the risk.
Phase I involves purchasing 30,000 units at a price of $5,000 per unit, for a total order value of $150 million. Phase II expands to 60,000 units with a total value of $300 million. Phase III is planned for 100,000 units at $3,000 per unit, and Phase IV for 150,000 units at $2,300 per unit.
The quantity is increasing, while the price is decreasing.
However, it is not clear whether the per-unit price includes ammunition, surface control equipment, training, maintenance, and communication infrastructure. Even if the price of a single aircraft is low, it cannot be assumed that the entire system, including group operations and support infrastructure, will be inexpensive.
The official request form outlines a four-stage plan that, when simply added together, totals 340,000 units. In contrast, the official Drone Dominance website states that it plans to purchase over 200,000 unmanned aerial vehicles by 2027. The reason for the discrepancy between these figures has not been confirmed.
This is why it cannot be definitively stated as the ultimate goal.
Why is it a new company rather than an existing defense company?
On February 3, 2026, the official list released included 25 companies, including Swarm Defense Technologies, Neros, Performance Drone Works, Vector Defense, and Auterion Government Solutions, which were invited to participate in Phase I of the competition.
This project requires a different pace than that of large weapon systems. Low-cost, small unmanned aerial vehicles must be rapidly tested, undergo actual user evaluations, and then move directly to production orders. This is why new companies and commercial technology firms have entered the procurement process.
CSET analyzed that most U.S. drone companies focus on small, Group 1-3 unmanned aerial vehicles. There are also many unlisted venture investment firms established since 2010. In contrast, there are only a few companies developing large, multi-purpose military drones.
The technology ecosystem is vast.
The mass production experience of commercial companies can be an advantage. Swarm Defense announced that Firefly has manufactured over 20,000 swarm-flying drones since 2017. CEO Kyle Dorosz stated, “Receiving an order for 4,000 Kiwi aircraft is a major milestone for Swarm Defense.” Marketing Director Connor McGaffey described the order as “huge.”
However, a light show and a test range are not the same thing. Just because a company manufactures many commercial drones does not guarantee that they can provide military-grade reliability in environments involving electronic warfare, GPS jamming, combat damage, and maintenance burdens.
Having produced a large quantity does not prove combat capability.
The U.S. Army National Guard announced that on June 3, 2026, it conducted a training program for instructors related to “Drone Dominance,” utilizing the Neros Archer FPV drone at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. This training program not only covers the manufacturing process but also includes training for actual operators, making it a comprehensive part of the project.
The real bottleneck is not the aircraft itself, but the components.
Drone Dominance does not only require manufacturing within the United States. It also evaluates supply chains from countries other than those targeted, with the aim of reducing dependence on components and raw materials from specific countries, such as China.
The problem is that it is difficult to verify the entire supply chain. It is necessary to examine the country of origin and production capacity of each component, including batteries, motors, electronic components, and sensors. Simply assembling products in the United States does not automatically resolve supply chain issues.
The GAO assessed that the Department of Defense is working to identify risks associated with reliance on foreign supply chains. However, it pointed out that there is a lack of visibility regarding most suppliers, including those providing raw materials and components, and that related activities are not well-coordinated.
The factory is visible, but the supply chain remains unclear.
Swarm Defense announced that it plans to produce 4,000 units of the Kiwi aircraft at its 40,000 sq ft facility in Auburn Hills, Michigan. While the order volume is significant, it is important to distinguish between receiving an order and delivering all the aircraft.
It has not been confirmed whether all 4,000 units were actually delivered, or what the delivery schedule and final performance evaluation were. It is also unknown whether other new companies can meet the promised quantities.
Fixed-price contracts have a dual nature. For the government, the advantage is the ability to control costs. For the companies involved, they bear the risks of rising costs and production disruptions. Fixed-price contracts may also limit the participation of companies with limited financial resources, or may prioritize cost reduction over quality.
A cheap contract does not always guarantee a cheap outcome.
The burden is shared between combat units and taxpayers.
U.S. military combat units have a reason to acquire a large number of low-cost drones. This is because they can deploy expendable unmanned aerial vehicles before exposing expensive platforms and personnel to danger. It is also expected to increase the number of battlefield surveillance and attack assets.
However, reliability, communication, and maintainability must be verified separately. It has not yet been confirmed how much “Drone Dominance” will reduce troop casualties and improve operational effectiveness in actual warfare.
Opportunities are also opening up for manufacturers within the United States. In the process of reducing reliance on Chinese-made components, new demand may arise for companies that manufacture batteries, motors, and electronic components. There is also the potential for expanding local factories and defense-related jobs.
The industrial policy also has a strong character.
The cost will be borne by U.S. taxpayers. If the project expands, defense budget expenditures could increase. In the process of establishing a non-China supply chain, component prices may temporarily rise. While this can reduce the risk of supply disruptions in the long term, the transition costs will not disappear entirely.
The war also has a dual nature. While inexpensive drones can enhance the survivability of the U.S. military, the opposing side can also increase the number of inexpensive attack drones it uses. This can lead to an increase in both air defense costs and the risk of civilian casualties.
The cheaper weapons become, the easier it is for them to spread.
Therefore, it is difficult to judge how cheap it is based solely on the aircraft price. Additional costs may include expenses for group operations, communication, ammunition, training, and maintenance. It is not clear whether the per-unit price listed in the official request includes all of these items.
The United States’ testing ground is mass production.
Drone Dominance is not a project that ends with a single demonstration. Phase I is planned to run from February 2026 to July 2026, and Phase II is planned to run from August 2026 to January 2027.
Phase I evaluation is likely to include a 10.0 km open terrain strike and a 1.0 km mock urban area strike. Both missions are planned to require a minimum payload of 2 kg.
Achieving successful flights and producing tens of thousands of units consistently are distinct capabilities. CSET pointed out that there are significant gaps in publicly available information regarding the manufacturing capabilities and supply chain resilience of U.S. drone companies. Although new companies have technology and order plans, it is not yet clear whether they possess a fully validated mass production system.
Supply chain information is also lacking.
There are three key points to verify in the future. First, whether the order of 4,000 units from Swarm Defense will actually result in deliveries. Second, how many of the 25 companies in Phase I will advance to the subsequent stage. Third, whether the non-China supply chain requirements can be verified down to the component level.
If the government only pays for delivered aircraft, the companies bear a significant portion of the costs associated with failures. However, if a company collapses, the supply schedule and the military’s procurement plans are also disrupted. This is why the risk allocation in the contract and the actual financial strength of the industrial base are both put to the test.
The Drone Dominance Program aims to “accelerate growth of the U.S. industrial base to outfit our combat units with cheap and effective U.S.-made UAS.” The direction is clear. However, the planned quantities and the actual production capacity are not yet the same.
The United States plans to procure hundreds of thousands of units. Now, what is needed is not simply a larger number, but proof that this quantity can be consistently produced.
The key areas of competition are factories and supply chains.
Frequently Asked Questions.
Can the United States actually produce hundreds of thousands of attack drones?
It is not yet possible to make a definitive statement. The Drone Dominance Program plans to procure hundreds of thousands of units in stages, but it is currently being verified whether new companies can meet the promised production volumes and establish stable, non-Chinese supply chains.
Why does the United States utilize newly established companies rather than existing large defense companies?
This is to rapidly test and mass-produce low-cost, small unmanned aerial vehicles. The U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle industry is characterized by a structure consisting of small Group 1-3 companies and many venture companies established since 2010.
What kind of company is Swarm Defense?
Swarm Defense started as the commercial drone light show company Firefly Drone Shows. It was reported to have received an order for 4,000 Kiwi single-use attack drones worth at least US$25 million and announced that it would produce them at a 40,000 sq ft facility.
What is the scale of Phase I of Drone Dominance?
The plan involves purchasing 30,000 units at a price of $5,000 per unit, for a total order value of $150 million. Twenty-five companies were invited to participate in Phase I of the competition.
If it is a drone manufactured in the United States, are all of its components also manufactured in the United States?
It is not possible to make such a definitive statement. It has not been confirmed for each company whether the batteries, motors, electronic components, and sensors are sourced from the United States or countries not subject to the restrictions.
If the price of drones decreases, will military spending be significantly reduced?
It is difficult to make a judgment based solely on the aircraft price. Additional costs may include swarm operations, communication, ammunition, training, maintenance, and communication infrastructure. It is not clear whether these items are included in the per-unit price.